Work in progress
Managed Representation for Authoritarian Rule: Chinese Congresses as Agents of Constituents and Party. For decades, scholars properly dismissed congresses of popularly elected representatives in mainland China as “rubber stamps.” Formally, as in other parliamentary systems, the congresses voice constituency interests, determine government composition, deliberate and vote on major issues of public policy, and monitor government performance. Practically, however, not only are many basic institutional features of parliamentarism absent, but the congresses function in an authoritarian political framework dominated by a single communist party. Yet Chinese congresses seem to have become important political players in recent years: they veto government reports, quiz and dismiss officials, and reject communist party candidates selected for leadership. The liveliest congresses are found in the localities—the provincial capitals, districts, counties, and townships across the country. The new congressional assertiveness presents an empirical puzzle because it was set in motion by rules designed, adopted, and promoted at the center of power in Beijing. Presumably, leaders at the top of the Leninist political hierarchy have not organized themselves to undermine the foundations of the communist party–state. Can rules that empower popularly elected representatives strengthen authoritarianism? This project investigates this question, drawing on qualitative field research and analysis of data from original probability sample surveys of elected congressional representatives and the mass public and focusing on local congresses.
| Books and book chapters | Journal articles |
| Surveys on chinese politics | Questionnaires, codebooks, data |
