

**University of Wisconsin-Madison  
Department of Political Science**

PS 827: Interest Groups  
Fall 2009, TH 1:20-3:20 pm  
Office Hours TH 11:00-1:00 pm  
Class Location: North Hall 422

Instructor: Susan Webb Yackee, Ph.D.  
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### **Learning Objectives**

The learning objectives for this course are three-fold. First, the students will achieve a fluency in the academic research on interest groups in the American government context—both on the demand aggregation of groups and the influence of these groups. Second, there will be an increase in student's critical thinking and communication skills, as they lead class discussion and probe new ideas in their writing. Third and finally, the students will, via their end of the semester presentations, prepare a research presentation and learn the skill set necessary to present at academic conferences and within the academic job market.

### **Method of Instruction**

The course will use a seminar format. The expectation is that all students will have read the assigned topics and completed any assignments ahead of class. The majority of class will be a discussion of the weekly course readings. These discussions will be lead by the students. Students ought to come to class with questions and topics for discussion. My role, as the Instructor, will be to facilitate discussion and spur new thinking about the assigned readings.

### **Course Components and Evaluation**

There are three main course components.

(1) *Reaction Papers*. The first component of the course will be four reaction papers. Students may choose to hand-in one reaction paper in any week in which course readings are assigned. It is the student's responsibility to ensure that he/she completes all four papers by the end of the semester. Papers not turned in will receive a zero. Papers are due at 11:00 AM on each Wednesday. Normal late penalties apply and will be enforced. Papers should be emailed to me. Each reaction paper should be three pages long. As always, write long and then cut out all unnecessary text. The text should be double-spaced and in a readable font with page numbers. Please include a bibliography, as necessary, which may be included in addition to the three-page document.

The reaction papers should critique one or more of that week's assigned readings. Each reaction paper should develop a coherent main argument and then develop this argument with several delineated examples from other work, broader arguments, or suggested inconsistencies. The reaction papers are *not* to reiterate or summarize the assigned readings. A good reaction paper will draw on the already completed readings for the course in developing the argument. A great reaction paper will go beyond these readings into the broader academic literature. I will provide a letter grade and comments on each reaction paper within one week.

Reaction Papers = 40% (5% for the first paper, 10% for the second and third paper, and 15% for the fourth paper. This format allows for and rewards student growth over the course of the semester.)

## (2) Academic Presentation

The final two class sessions will be taken up by academic presentations. These presentations will simulate a “job talk” on the political science job market. The presentations will be approximate 45 minutes long and will be followed by questions from the audience. The format for the presentation will be: introduction and puzzle, literature review, methodology, data, presentation of findings, and conclusions. The presenters will use PowerPoint to guide their discussions. Given that we are simulating the job market experience, the presentations should be practiced, polished, and professional. Presenters should come in professional dress. Please practice and time the presentations in advance!

On the job market, you will present your own arguments and original research. Given the limits of the class, I will not be requiring you to present your own research. Instead, you will choose a major book (or possibly a major article with my approval) in the interest group tradition that we have *not* covered in class. For the purposes of this presentation, you will be acting as if you devised the argument and conducted the research found in the book. You will have to argue for the book’s methodologies and defend the research choices made in the book. Thus, you must be extremely familiar with the book in question. [Additionally, you may have to perform additional research to become familiar with the book’s research methodologies.] You will not be able to present the entirety of the book. Therefore, you will have to make strategic decisions about what to present and how to present it. You should assume that you are presenting to an audience of established political science colleagues, who are not interest group or even American government specialists.

Academic Presentation = 50%

## (3) Discussion and Participation

All seminars live and die by the quality of discussion. Student participation is necessary to make this seminar a lively and engaging educational experience. Thus, I expect noteworthy discussion and participation from all students within each class meeting.

Discussion and Participation = 10%

### Letter Grade Equivalents

A	95
AB	90
B	85
BC	80
C	75
CD	70
D	65
DF	60
F	50
No Credit	0

### Grading Standard

93-100	A
88-92	AB
83-87	B
78-82	BC
73-77	C
69-72	CD
63-68	D
59-62	DF
<59	F

### Expectations for Academic Integrity

I expect a full adherence to UW’s code of academic integrity. I also expect that you will acknowledge all ideas that are not your own through proper citation. Please put all direct quotes in quotations. Any accepted format for citation may be used as long as it is used consistently. You may want to follow the style format of a major academic journal, such as, the *American Political Science Review*. There is to be no cheating in this course – be it via plagiarism or some other form of falsification. I may run all student papers through the software that checks for academic violations. Students who do not adhere to the highest levels of integrity may receive zero credit on assignment or exam, fail the course, or suffer some other consequence, depending on the action.

**Disabilities**

People with disabilities will be fully included in this course. Please inform me if you need any special accommodations in the curriculum, instruction, or assessments of this course to enable you to participate fully. Confidentiality of the shared information will be strictly maintained. Certain accommodations may require the assistance of the UW's McBurney Disability Office - <http://www.mcburney.wisc.edu/>

**Email**

I will return emails from students within three business days. Do not email shortly before a class, presentation, or exam with the expectation that I will be able to respond immediately to your concern.

**Late Assignments and Make Up Policy**

All assignments that are not provided to me at the beginning of class (or when I request them in class) will be reduced by a letter grade automatically. Assignments will then be deducted by another letter grade for each additional day late (beginning at 8 AM the next day). I do not accept late assignments in my mailbox or under my door. Also, I do not accept assignments via email unless otherwise indicated by me. Late presentations (or other assignments) due to illness will be handled on a case-by-case basis and may also result in deductions. Make up assignments are at my discretion and may not match the assignment provided in class.

I thank and acknowledge the APSA POP syllabus sharing system and specifically Prof. Michael Heaney for ideas regarding the formulation and implementation of this course.

**Schedule of Activities**

Thursdays

9/3/09

**Introduction**

9/10/09

**History and Development of Interest Groups in the U.S. Context**

\*Alexander Hamilton, *The Federalist Papers*. New York: Bantam Books. Number 10 and 51.

\*James Yoho. 1995. "Madison on the Beneficial Effects of Interest Groups: What Was Left Unsaid in Federalist 10." *Polity*, Vol. 27, No. 4. (Summer): 587-605.

\*Daniel J. Tichenor and Richard A. Harris. 2003. "Organized Interests and American Political Development." *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 117, No. 4 (Winter): 587-612.

9/17/09

**Collective Action Problem**

\*Mancur Olson. 1971. [1965] *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

9/24/09

**Overcoming the Collective Action Problem**

\*Robert H. Salisbury. 1969. "An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups." *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (February): 1-32.

\*Jack L. Walker. 1983. "The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 77, No. 2 (June): 390-406.

\*Robert H. Salisbury. 1984. "Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 78, No. 1 (March): 64-76.

\*John Mark Hansen. 1985. "The Political Economy of Group Membership." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 79, No. 1 (March): 79-96.

10/1/09

### **Prep Time – Students Identify Presentation Topics**

10/8/09

### **Issue Networks**

\*Thomas L. Gais, Mark A. Peterson, and Jack L. Walker. 1984. "Interest Groups, Iron Triangles and Representative Institutions in American National Government." *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (April): 161-185.

\*William P. Browne. 1990. "Organized Interests and Their Issue Niches: A Search for Pluralism in a Policy Domain." *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 52, No. 2 (May): 477-509.

\*John P. Heinz, Edward O. Laumann, Robert H. Salisbury, Robert L. Nelson. 1990. "Inner Circles or Hollow Cores? Elite Networks in National Policy Systems." *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 52, No. 2 (May): 356-390.

Daniel P. Carpenter, Kevin M. Esterling, and David M. J. Lazer. 2004. "Friends, Brokers, and Transitivity: Who Informs Whom in Washington Politics." *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 66, No. 1 (February): 224-246.

10/15/09

### **Campaigns, Parties, and Public Opinion**

\*Robert E. Hogan. 2005. "State Campaign Finance Laws and Interest Group Electioneering Activities." *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 67, No. 5 (August), 887-906.

\*Seth E. Masket. 2007. "It Takes an Outsider: Extra-legislative Organization and Partisanship in the California Assembly, 1849-2006." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 51, No. 3 (July): 482-97.

\*Ken Kollman. 1998. *Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1-3.

10/22/09

### **The Political Economy of Expertise**

*\*Progress report on presentation topics*

\*Kevin M. Esterling. 2004. *The Political Economy of Expertise: Information and Efficiency in American National Politics*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

10/29/09

### **Lobbying and Coalitions in the U.S. Context**

\*Scott Ainsworth and Itai Sened. 1993. "The Role of Lobbyists: Entrepreneurs with Two Audiences." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (August): 834-866.

\*Marie Hojnacki. 1997. "Interest Groups' Decisions to Join Alliances or Work Alone." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (January): 61-87.

\*Richard L. Hall and Alan V. Deardorff. 2006. "Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 100, No. 1 (February): 69-84.

\*Richard L. Hall and Frank Wayman. 1990. "Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 84, No 3 (September): 797-820.

11/5/09

### **Influencing the President and Courts**

\*Mark A. Peterson. 1992. "The Presidency and Organized Interests: White House Patterns of Interest Group Liaison." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 86, No. 3. (September): 612-625.

\*Gregory A. Caldeira and John R. Wright. 1990. "Amici Curiae before the Supreme Court: Who Participates, When, and How Much?" *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (August): 782-806.

\*Gregory A. Caldeira and John R. Wright. 1998. "Lobbying for Justice: Organized Interests, Supreme Court Nominations, and United States Senate." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 42, No. 2. (April): 499-523.

11/12/09

### **Influencing the Bureaucracy 1**

\*Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast. 1989. "Structure and Process, Politics, and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies." *Virginia Law Review*. Vol. 75, No. 2 (March), 431-482.

\*Steven J. Balla. 1998. "Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 92, No. 3 (September): 663-673.

\*Daniel P. Carpenter. 2002. "Groups, the Media, Agency Waiting Costs, and FDA Drug Approval." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 46, No. 3: 490-505.

\*Daniel P. Carpenter. 2004. "Protection without Capture: Product Approval by a Politically Responsive, Learning Regulator." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 98, No. 4: 613-631.

11/19/09

### **Influencing the Bureaucracy 2**

\*Amy McKay and Susan Webb Yackee. 2007. "Interest Group Competition on Federal Agency Rules." *American Politics Research*, Vol. 35: 336-357.

\*Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb Yackee. 2006. "A Bias toward Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the Bureaucracy." *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 68: 128-139.

\*Susan Webb Yackee. Working Manuscript. "The Hidden Politics of Regulation." [I will distribute this reading a week before class.]

11/26/09

### **Thanksgiving Break**

12/3/09

### **"Job Talk" - Presentations 1**

12/10/09

### **"Job Talk" - Presentations 2**