Beloit: A Town with a Bad Rap

by Joanna Balsamo-Lilien, Ted Fondrk, David Saikia, Rachel Weber

Ask Midwesterners to name the centers of violent youth activity in Illinois and Wisconsin, and they will likely say “Chicago and Milwaukee.”  But a surprising number of people we talked to also identified Beloit, Wisconsin, as a city with youth violence problems. Located on the border between Illinois and Wisconsin, the City of Beloit is dealing with many issues related to gang violence. While some problems are typical of any community with 36,000 residents, others are unique to the area. Most strikingly, Beloit has a rare combination of heightened awareness toward potential problems coupled with a perhaps undeserved reputation as a violent community.

Unlike many of the communities analyzed throughout the state over the years, Beloit is not a community in denial. Through interviews with police, social workers, school officials, children, and other residents, we quickly discovered that everyone recognizes the potential for violent activity. Further, most people we interviewed attribute the town's reputation as a drug hub to its location between several larger urban communities.

In countering these potential problems, several institutions have implemented a variety of programs, aimed at various aspects of youth crime. Some programs in Beloit are substantial in size and funding, but many remain small and obscure. Though some programs address specific problems, others are likely in place to respond to the town’s gritty image, an image that may be unjustified. In fact, Beloit has more programs targeting youth violence than many communities of comparable size with higher crime rates.

At this point, the biggest concern for this town, we believe, is that of a backlash—that is, because the town has handled problems better than other communities, people may come to believe that there are no problems at all. This could result in the already small programs being typecast as a misallocation of resources, and ultimately lead to their demise. Paradoxically, the programs aimed at intervention and prevention could get a negative reputation because their effects are not obvious. In order to be viewed as essential, they would have to be less effective . Promoting these programs is difficult because program coordinators cannot saturate the public with tales of doom regarding a situation that clearly does not exist. But again, reporting otherwise is practically a call for their dismantling.

Although the community recognizes the potential for problems, this does not mean that the sources of the problems are fully understood. Fights between teenagers are common at area high schools, for example, but both students and administrators deny that any real percentage of the violence is attributable to gang affiliation. And though one student claimed that “drugs are everywhere” in Beloit Memorial High School, she echoed a sentiment expressed by classmates that drugs must  materialize within school walls rather than come from established sources.

In this overview, we hope to provide an accurate assessment of youth problems, both actual and potential, in Beloit. Not only should this validate the existence of most programs, but it should give them rightful praise for their part in preventing real violence. Further, other communities can look to some of these efforts in an attempt to establish their own “best policies” strategy.

A Snapshot of Beloit

Aggregate income is lower here than in most areas of the state, with the main industries being tied to manufacturing—many of which have recently left the city. Beloit is close to Chicago, Rockford, and Milwaukee, all cities known for high crime rates. Demographically, the city is predominantly white, with substantial pockets of African-American and Latino residents, creating a racial mix unusual for the region. For instance, in Beloit Memorial High School, minorities comprise nearly thirty percent of the student body. Still, the pockets remain pockets—across town at Turner High School, that same proportion is less than five percent.

In many troubled areas of the country, critics commonly associate these economic, geographic, and demographic characteristics with violence. Often, people associate gang activity with depressed urban areas, where racial diversity may create tension, and monetary opportunities may seem limited.

But in fact, Beloit is not a particularly violent community. Its crime rate is actually lower than many towns that enjoy reputations as placid communities. According to a recent report from the Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance, Beloit had a per capita murder rate of 3 per 100,000 people for the early part of the 1990s. In contrast, the national average for similarly sized cities approached a rate of 5 per 100,000. Since 1990, crime has dropped 35 percent, the police department reports. Acknowledging that four to five homicides per year were the norm during the 1970s, Police Chief Richard Thomas states that the town did not record a single homicide in 1999.

Regarding the educational system, Beloit has an expulsion rate of .53 percent, which is comparable to that of Madison, a district often championed nationally for its public school system. Similarly, suspension rates proved comparable or favorable to many other communities in the state with more positive reputations.

But beyond the symptomatic criteria that could lead to a bad environment, what other factors contribute to Beloit being considered a “dangerous” area? Some experts, including police officers, believe that it is linked to Beloit being located on the Illinois border. When Wisconsin had a lower drinking age than Illinois, many rowdy teens would drive into Beloit for the readily accessible alcohol. As former Beloit Police Chief Terry Fell testifies, when Wisconsin’s low drinking age was still in effect, it inadvertently created an unruly bar district that turned the 600 block of Fourth Street into “a zoo.” When the allure of underage drinking was removed, many of the problems naturally disappeared, he claims.

Nevertheless, just because Beloit’s official crime statistics are no worse than the national average, this does not mean that the city has no problems warranting consideration. As Doug Reynolds, the safety coordinator for the Beloit school district acknowledges, deterring crime in school requires a unified effort between school officials, the police, hospital workers, and students. Though he argues that criminal activity is limited, Mr. Reynolds does acknowledge a known presence of at least two major gangs: the Latin Kings and the Gangster Disciples. At Beloit Memorial High School, Principal Jeff Tortemasi reports that there is a physical fight between students about once a week, while at Turner High School, officials report that a major fight erupts about once a month, with verbal altercations occurring almost daily. Again, students confess that even if drug use isn’t rampant, drugs are readily available.

That said, Beloit seems to be battling the problems associated with violent activity better than many towns that are wealthier, and that have a less volatile racial mix. Therefore, perhaps an examination of tactics used in this community can serve as guidelines for others.

Beloit’s Approach

In an attempt to avoid problems, several groups offer programs to counteract youth violence. Most of them are preventive in nature, with the administering organizations ranging from social institutions to the municipal police.

The focus of violence prevention activity seems to be at the school level, where the youth can be most easily monitored. First, the high schools are equipped with surveillance cameras and other security measures, such as a sign-in station at Memorial High School for anyone entering after 8:30 AM. Further, police liaisons remain visible during times of heavy traffic, and their very presence unquestionably acts as a deterrent for wayward behavior. In addition, many officials carry walkie-talkies, so they can report activity and remain in contact with each other wherever they are on school grounds.

Beyond these security measures, the schools rely on students for the vast majority of information about budding problems. “Most students want to keep the school safe,” reports Principal Tortemasi, and he encourages students to report any signs of violence to him. To foster this openness, Tortemasi tries to keep himself and his staff accessible to students, and he strives to keep anonymity for those who report problems. At both Memorial and Turner High Schools, students receive $50 cash for reporting weapons on campus. Additional efforts include the Knights Academy at Memorial, where “at risk” students must report periodically to a probation officer who monitors behavior.

These measures appear to be working—at least within the schools. Both students and faculty report that most violent activity is confined to areas away from campus. When violence does erupt in the hallways or classrooms, the incident is usually tied to a conflict that arose outside of school, according to those connected with the school. Again, Tortemasi stresses that “most fights pop up on Tuesday or Wednesday, over something that happened on Saturday.” This makes it difficult for the schools to prevent all violent outbreaks.

So the remaining groups in Beloit target stopping the conflicts on Saturday, when youth have few organized activities and little supervision. As one social worker stated, deviant behavior often stems from boredom. In response, the City of Beloit offers several programs to combat the daily monotony by providing alternate activities for young people.

The following list provides a sample of the programs available in Beloit. Some take aim at providing alternate activities for young people in general, while others target only those youth diagnosed as “at-risk.” Still others operate without the presence of youth, and are designed and maintained by adults with the safety of the community in mind.

Building on the Building Blocks of Youth (BOBBY)

Administered by Beloit’s Department of Health, this program tries to target at-risk youth by asking schools to recommend children it sees as susceptible to deviant behavior. Once recommended, the children have the opportunity to join the program, wherein they learn such skills as conflict resolution. More immediately, the children partake in after-school activities, in an attempt to channel excess energy in positive ways.

Safe and Drug Free Schools

Under Mr. Fran Fruzen’s supervision, this program is provided through the Kolag Center. Working closely with schools, Fruzen aims to raise the level of consciousness about gang activities among youth. Through the program, the Kolag Center provides such services as removing graffiti, offering a drug prevention program, and putting students in touch with school resource officers.

Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT)

GREAT’s stated purpose is to “reduce gang activity” and “educate (Beloit’s) youth about the consequences of gang violence.” Founded in 1993, the program offers a four-week program for children in the third and fifth grades. During the program, children learn conflict resolution and sound decision-making. For older children, seventh graders can enroll in a ten-week program during the school year or an eight-week intensive program over the summer. At these sessions, mentors stress positive alternatives to violence and gang activity.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Beloit has no more problems than the average city, which is to say that it has problems. They are not as intense, however, or as commonplace as many assume. At the same time, those who do not see the situation as dire may advocate the elimination of programs aimed at a problem they see as nonexistent. Therefore, we believe that the city should implement a two-pronged strategy: one involves comprehensive evaluations of both the city’s problems and the city’s programs, and the other involves a public awareness campaign.

The most immediate—and the most involved—of our recommendations concerns evaluation. In fact, we believe Beloit and its citizens could benefit tremendously by using evaluation techniques to assess the extent of youth violence in the area. But beyond using evaluation to put the problem in perspective, we think that key players in Beloit need to review the programs currently offered for effectiveness. Certainly, many of the existing efforts are noble, contributing significantly to Beloit’s relative success in combating violence. Those efforts notwithstanding, some undeniable truths warrant an honest appraisal of current methods.

First, as stated, “success” is a relative term; comparing Beloit’s crime statistics with those of similar-sized towns may not be appropriate. While such comparisons can be useful in a public awareness campaign, they tell very little about the living situation in the city itself. Though a non-comparative definition of success remains elusive for Beloit, most would agree that there is still violence in the area, and minimizing this violence is a primary goal for most of the programs in question.

Second, while the city of Beloit should measure success against its own standards and not those of other communities, the specific programs that help comprise the area’s social network need a comparative base. This is not to say that every organization involved in reducing youth crime should become overtly competitive. Rather, these comparisons should revolve around the commonsensical notion that some practices work better than others. Even within specific organizations, individuals know that they are more adept at providing some services than they are others. For the sake of continuous improvement, administrators of the less effective programs should study the practices of the more efficient providers.

Third, every service comes at a cost, and anything with a cost will eventually be called into question. Though there are no guarantees that any efforts can eliminate the scrutiny that comes with funding, administrators would serve their programs well if they knew how they fit within the network of service providers. Most important, evaluation of this network can minimize duplication of efforts, a misallocation of resources by any standard. In the larger organizations, such as the city’s Department of Health and Human Services, various divisions frequently provide the same services. At times, administrators coordinate these efforts, but often, these initiatives are simply redundant, spawned from poor communication. If communication is poor within an organization, it is often nonexistent between multiple organizations.

On the surface, it may seem that we are suggesting there is room for only one provider for each service in town. This is not the case. As in the private sector, competition is generally good, nurturing innovation and providing variety to consumers. But when public funds are being used, citizens should not finance out-and-out redundancy. Nor should they continue to pay for programs that are under-used or demonstrably inferior. And ultimately, institutions should not be forced to continue partaking in activities that they know they were not designed to handle.

Given these truths, our proposed evaluation should be multifaceted. First, key players—school officials, social workers, police officers, and city employees—should come up with the criteria on which the city will base its definition of success. Since many of these players will be present at the April 28-29 La Follette program on youth violence and gangs, and perhaps meeting for the first time, this event may provide a unique opportunity. One of our primary objectives should be to fashion a definition of success by the close of the conference.

A second objective should be to strengthen the existing network between social organizations, schools, and other public and private entities. We will ask those in attendance to be prepared to speak on what their organization does, and what they wish to gain from the other represented organizations.

Finally, and this is beyond the scope of the conference, we suggest that each program define its mission, seriously evaluate its own practices, and assess its own efficacy at accomplishing its mission. In doing so, the programs need to make some key decisions. First, they must define their clients: are they students, community members, parents, victims, or at-risk youths? These clients, not the program administrators, are best equipped to tell of a program’s strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, they should be the ones surveyed. Second, they must decide who should design and implement the evaluation instrument. Is this something that internal resources can effectively do, or should an outside body handle these tasks? Third, they must decide what they intend to do with the results.

Without question, evaluations present problems. To start, they are tedious and time-consuming. To that end, we suggest that administrators remain in contact with the La Follette Institute after the program, and view the Institute as a possible resource. Further, finding a survey instrument that effectively diagnoses areas for improvement remains problematic. No matter how well designed, such surveys always invite cynicism, with complaints that they rely too heavily on statistical inferences from material that is not easily quantified. “If I help just one person, it’s a success,” the old cliché goes. While the person putting forth the cliché might believe this to be true, most objective people would dispute nearly every aspect of the claim—from who the one person is, to whether they were actually helped, to whether it was the speaker who did the helping, to whether more people should have been helped.

Clearly, undertaking a comprehensive evaluation is difficult. But it is a necessary and worthwhile pursuit. Only with some evidence of success—as defined by members of the Beloit community alone—can the city consider our second recommendation, which is to undertake a public awareness campaign.

Specifically, we believe that officials at all levels would do well to continue with public awareness campaigns on two fronts: one aimed at shirking the city’s unjust reputation as a dangerous place, and another dedicated to maintaining current levels of awareness about the threat of violence. Without such efforts, Beloit runs the risk of losing participation in the programs that are currently provided. Without these efforts, some programs might ultimately be dismantled and crime might increase.

But more important, other towns with richer resources would do well to follow Beloit’s lead. Effective management of youth criminal behavior requires a concerted effort on the part of the police, the schools, the social network, and families. The city has developed an effective strategy for minimizing crime by encouraging interaction between these groups. Over the past ten years, Beloit has cleaned up its streets. With any luck, the same can be done with its reputation.