WHAT SHOULD WE KNOW ABOUT POLITICIANS’ PERFORMANCE INFORMATION NEED AND USE?

Labinot Demaj and Lukas Summermatter

ABSTRACT

The question of legislators’ use of performance information is crucial, since – among others purposes – data on outputs and outcomes is meant to inform about the performance of public managers, programs as well as organizations, and ultimately to influence the allocation of financial means. Limited empirical evidence on parliamentarians’ performance information behavior provides contradictory findings with respect to the extent to which this new kind of data is used. This paper aims to draw an outline of the insights we have about politicians’ information need and use in general. It sets a particular focus on the question of how the use of performance information by politicians could be analyzed more systematically in the future by referring to conceptual treatments of earlier periods or allied disciplines. We show how future research could profit by shifting the focus of analysis from the isolated analysis of performance information to the context-bounded politician and her information needs, by considering the political rationale with respect to the information-decision nexus, and by including possibilities of symbolic or strategic types of performance information utilization. Conceiving politicians as need-driven and goal-oriented information users requires a different definition of what data inform about performance.

Keywords - Information Needs, Information Use, Performance Information, Policy Positions, Politicians

INTRODUCTION

We do not know much about how and to which extent politicians of the legislative branch of government use the information supplied to them by public administration – especially those concerning the performance of public agencies and programs (Pollitt, 2006a, p. 42ff). Although rarely based on a systematic analysis of parliamentary use, the majority of existing surveys and meta-inquiries suggests that performance information is rarely used by legislators (Ho & Coates, 2004, p. 31; see also Joyce, 1993, p. 14ff; Julnes & Holzer, 2001, p. 694; Matheson & Kwon, 2003, p. 14; Poister & Streib, 1999, p. 331f; Pollitt, 2008; Raudla, 2012, p. 2). This conclusion exists alongside a few stud-
ies that have been able to evidence that there are occasions where legislators do actually use performance information (Askim, 2007, 2009; Askim & Hanssen, 2008; ter Bogt, 2001, 2003, 2004).

The roots of these contradictory findings are worth exploring, since it is a fundamental prerequisite of the modern public management conception that politicians use available information. From this perspective, information supply serves as the service in return for politicians allowing administration to assume operational decision-making authority. On the one hand, politicians must ‘see’ how public services are produced, how they contribute to the achievement of a desired outcome, and what the costs of production are. On the other hand, given this information, politicians’ capacity to steer administrative action shall be recovered, since the new information systems causally link relevant aspects with each other and, ideally, enable its users to evaluate expectable consequences of particular interventions (Bawden, 2006, p. 15; Schedler, 2003, p. 45f).

Christopher Pollitt calls it “mildly amazing” that, while we have amassed many studies of how managers and professionals use or fail to use performance information, we still have only a few analyses of what the ultimate users, elected politicians, do with all the material now thrust upon them. “Prejudices, dreams and stereotypes” of how politicians react to carefully-crafted performance data do exist on both sides of the Atlantic, but hardly any studies that address this empirical question and provide answers whose “significance in a democratic context can hardly be exaggerated” (Pollitt, 2006b, p. 76f).

Based on a review of existing works, this paper aims to draw an outline of the insights we have about politicians’ information need and use in general. It sets a particular focus on the question of how the use of performance information by politicians could be analyzed more systematically in the future by referring to conceptual treatments of earlier periods or allied disciplines of policy and information science. For this purpose and as a working definition the concept of ‘information’ is conceived as “any difference a person perceives in her environment or within herself and encompasses any aspect that she notices in the pattern of reality” (Case, 2008, p. 5). ‘Performance information’ on the other hand conventionally describes systematic information about inputs, throughputs, outputs and outcomes as well as about relationships among these dimensions of public programs as well as organizations, whether intended or not, and generated by systems and processes conceived to produce such information (e.g., Pollitt, 2006a, p. 39; Siegel & Summermatter, 2008).

The relevant body of literature for the review was assembled by an extensive research of scientific databases. A search for publications containing ‘information’ in the title field and within the subject areas of ‘Political Science’ and ‘Public Administration’ resulted in 1134 potentially relevant documents. A consecutive refinement by document type revealed that ‘journal articles’ make up 54% of those publications, followed by 30% ‘book reviews’. The rest of the publications consist of ‘proceedings paper’, ‘editorial material’, etc. Table 1 gives an overview of the top ten journals for the document type of ‘articles’.
As Table 1 shows, publications mainly concerned with the aspect of information are not concentrated on a few sources but are spread over a total of 96 scientific journals. However, most of the articles categorized as relevant were published in ‘Public Administration Review’. A further refinement was conducted aiming at filtering publications treating information in connection with politicians. These publications provided the basis for consecutively tracing additional work by using forward and backward citation maps in order to analyze these reference lists over a period of two generations.3

Table 2 on the next page shows our selection of publications with a particular focus on legislators’ information need and use – in general and for decision-making purposes in particular. Publications are arranged according to whether they provide conceptual and/or empirical insights and are listed in a chronological order, starting with treatments from the late 1960s. Publications that provide literature overviews, such as from Pollitt (2006a), Bimber (1991) or Weiss (1997, 1998), were treated as conceptual works, since they help to draw conclusions about strengths and weaknesses of existing approaches.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: We start with a discussion of empirical works and organize insights according to reform periods. Next, conceptual treatments are reviewed and are arranged according to the fundamental propositions they suggest for the study of politicians’ information behavior. Finally, we conclude by drawing some general implications for future research and by discussing potential research strategy designs.

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**Table 1: Information in Political Science and Public Administration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Titles</th>
<th>Record Count</th>
<th>% of N=559</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration Review</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Political Science Review</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Journal of Political Science</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Studies Journal</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Journal of Public Administration</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal of Politics</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Public Administration</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Research Quarterly</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Studies Quarterly</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (86 Journals)</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Web of Science (2012)
Table 2: Publications Treating Politicians’ Information Need and Use

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Empirical</th>
<th>Conceptual</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schendelen (1975)</td>
<td>Kovenock (1973)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zwier (1979)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Koehler, Schendelen, Jernberg, Kovenock, Porter (1973)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Webber (1984)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Whiteman (1985)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Huckfeldt &amp; Sprague (1987)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guston, Jones, &amp; Branscomb (1997)</td>
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<td>Guston, Jones, &amp; Branscomb (1997)</td>
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<td>Steccolini (2004)</td>
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<td>Curristine (2005)</td>
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<td>Guston, Jones, &amp; Branscomb (1997)</td>
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<td>Curristine (2005)</td>
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<td>Guston, Jones, &amp; Branscomb (1997)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Askim (2007)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Johnson &amp; Talbot (2007)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Askim, Hanssen (2008)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bourdeaux (2008)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Frisco &amp; Stalebrink (2008)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jansen (2008)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Askim (2008)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Patty (2009)</td>
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<td>Wolanin (1976)</td>
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INFORMATION IN EMPIRICAL STUDIES

Publications providing empirical material may either be attributed to the period of the 1970s and 1980s, when specialization and decentralization were at the forefront of congressional reforms, or to the New Public Management (NPM) era, when the reorganization of the public administration apparatus was accompanied by the credo of output and outcome measurement and its reporting to elected officials.

The Use of Policy Information after U.S. Congressional Reforms

Bimber (1991) provides an overview of the first period and summarizes the scholarly debate as one that was mainly divided over the importance of information and expertise to the work and policy output of U.S. Congress (Bimber, 1991, p. 589ff.). Advocates of the specialization and decentralization reforms within Congress aimed at bringing the information capacity and sophistication of the parliament closer to that of the executive branch of government. A lack of modern technology, insufficient staff and other inadequate resources were blamed for causing an ‘information gap’ and for restricting parliament’s political power as well as its capacity for making informed policy decisions.
Schneier (1970), Schick (1976) and Jones (1976) disagreed with this view and challenge the idea that an increased availability of ‘objective information’ and an improved access to it would enhance legislators’ policy making capacity. They suggest that the purpose of policy analysis for legislators is to provide evidence for what their political judgment tells them is correct. It is argued that what deters legislators from seeking intelligent information in an objective, goal-free sense is the institutional character of this law-producing body. Congressmen, as Schick puts it, “seem more concerned about the distributive effects of public policies than about pro bono publico benefit-cost ratios. Unlike the analyst who seeks to maximize aggregate national welfare, the legislator knows that it is someone’s welfare that is to be benefited” (Schick, 1976, p. 217, italics in original).

Empirical studies of parliamentary decision-making accompanying this debate focused on the influence new information had on decision-making, on defining and categorizing information, they attempted to reveal relevant sources and analyzed the flow of information within the parliament. Contributions come from Bradley (1973) and Weber (1977) who make a distinction between substantial policy information and political information about positions of other actors on pending decisions and about the potential impact on legislators’ reelection or career prospects (see also Sabatier & Whiteman, 1985, p. 397). Zwier (1979, p. 34ff) shows that specialist legislators rely upon different information sources than nonspecialists. Whereas the former group uses many noncongressional sources such as the executive branch and interest groups, the latter appear to be more dependent on their constituency and colleagues.

Porter (1974) introduced a two-step communication model and showed that information flows from lobbyists and administrators to specialist legislators and committeemen, respectively, who in turn “retail” it to others in the parliament (Porter, 1974, p. 705). Building on the work of Porter (1974), Sabatier & Whiteman (1985, p. 397ff.) add “staffs” of specialist legislators as an intermediary and suggest a three-stage-model of information flow. They stress the filtering position staff has within the legislative decision-making process. In addition, the authors show that policy information and political information follow different paths in order to reach legislators.

Kingdon (1981) sheds light on legislators’ information search behavior. He observes that parliamentarians do not have much incentive to engage in an extensive search for information, given the sharp time constraints they face, the competition of many matters for their attention, and the disposition of legislators “to be not very concerned with many of the subjects before them” (Kingdon, 1981, p. 242). In an analogy to Cyert & March’s (1963, p. 120) “Behavioral Theory of the Firm”, Kingdon (1981, p. 228) portrays legislators’ information search behavior as “problemistic”; that is, they do not look for information unless they face a problem to which “simple decision rules” fail to provide a solution. In other words, a) if a pending decision does not imply a political problem with her district, b) if a legislator has a fixed opinion on the issue or c) if she has already established a voting history on that subject, there is no need to demand information about it, Kingdon (1981, p. 230) claims.

Lastly, based on an extensive study of empirical material, Leviton & Hughes (1981, p. 533ff) identify five major clusters of variables that are consistently related to a higher
probability of policy information utilization. To be used, available information has to be relevant with respect to policy concerns. Although difficult to achieve, relevance is increased the more available information addresses the policy-makers’ needs and the more timely it is reported. Second, the quality of communication between the producer of information and its end user increases the potential for use. The quality, in turn, seems to be higher in cases where communication between the actors occurs not sporadically but frequently and where organizational hierarchy is low, thereby preventing the obstruction of valuable information. Third, to be used, available information must be recognized to be relevant for the matter at hand. Better comprehension and therefore higher probability of utilization can be achieved by highlighting the implications and recommendations particular information has for the policy at hand. Fourth, in order to be used, available information has to be credible. Credibility is affected by several considerations, such as by comparisons with other available information, the individual intuition or knowledge about an issue, the credibility of the information producer as well as by the methodological quality and a professional presentation of reported information. Lastly, using information in a political context requires its advocacy by the end user. It has been found that advocacy for information can be better achieved by involving potential users in the process of producing the information through regular consultations.

The Use of Information in NPM Settings

More recent empirical studies of information use are concerned by the respective consequences NPM reforms exhibit on the politics-administration nexus. Although varying in their national differentiation, NPM reforms aim to improve the old-style Weberian (1978, p. 112ff.) conception of administrative action by suggesting shared responsibilities between politics and the public administration with respect to strategic and operational decision-making authority (Schedler, 2003). To put it simply, NPM envisions the legislative branch to be responsible for providing the targeted outcomes whereas the executive branch is granted responsibility to decide on how these outcomes can be achieved most efficiently and effectively (Amstrong, 1985; Bowsher, 1985; Frank & D'Souza, 2004). In an NPM environment performance information is crucial. It is needed to set targets in management contracts, to compare them with actual performance, to emphasize outputs and to focus on efficiency (Jansen, 2008, p. 169). Its conveyance to politics aims to compensate the democratically elected body for its permission to ‘let the managers manage’ and to disenthrall administration from its ‘black box’ image by increasing transparency. In essence, performance measurement and management is ultimately meant to influence decision-making in politics and the allocation of financial means to activities and programs (Curristine, 2005).

Compared to the first period of research about politicians’ information behavior, most current studies focus exclusively on the particular type of performance information and do not include politicians’ behavior toward other kinds of information. In general, there is skepticism about the factual use of reported performance information by legislators (e.g., Bussmann, 1996, p. 313; Moynihan, 2005b, p. 204f; Pollitt, 2006a, p. 46ff; ter Bogt, 2004, p. 241). It is argued that performance measurement and performance management are activities by and for the executive branch of government and it “often ‘hits
a wall’ when it [...] comes to the legislative or policy-making process” (Ho & Coates, 2004, p. 31, emphasis in original). Since the political process is characterized by instability due to changing coalitions and value driven compromises, incrementalism and muddling through dominate political decision-making and prevent attempts of rationalization (Bussmann, 1996, p. 313). Besides the very nature of the political process, there are also institutional elements which are claimed to account for the limited use of performance information by legislators. It is argued that if legislature’s role – for example in the budget process – is limited, then politicians’ motivation to engage with performance information and to use them for decision-making purposes can be expected to be rather low (Bourdeaux, 2008; Cunningham & Harris, 2005). Lastly, individual characteristics such as the length of political experience and proficiency of a legislator could supplement the use of performance information (Askim, 2008).

Some of the limited empirical insights we have on these issues stem from ter Bogt’s (2001, 2003, 2004) case studies and survey research on Dutch Aldermen – the top echelon of Dutch councilors. Ter Bogt (2004, p. 222) suggests that the extent to which reported performance information is used by politicians decreases the more politicized, complex, uncertain, and less measureable a policy field is. In such cases, legislators address different sources and other kinds of information in order to evaluate the performance of managers, public programs, and organizations. Instead of referring to data in written reports, they prefer face-to-face encounters with civil servants in order to get richer information about concrete issues (ter Bogt, 2004, p. 228). In addition, ter Bogt (2001, p. 634f.) notes that politicians’ evaluation style is not primarily based on what ‘we’ call performance information; that is, information on outputs and outcomes. He suggests that legislators’ style of performance appraisal is better characterized as “operations-conscious”; that is, a lot of attention is paid to activities and processes within the public administration, which are considered to be better indicators for a well-functioning of the apparatus (ter Bogt, 2003). Overall, ter Bogt supports the view that politicians do not value the performance information reported to them and therefore make only limited use of it (ter Bogt, 2001, p. 631).

Askim’s (2007) study of Norwegian local Councilors’ use of written performance information derives a different conclusion. Based on Barzelay (2003), Askim disaggregates the decision-making process into a pre-decisional, a decisional, and a post-decisional stage in order to derive the different functions performance information serves for legislators along this timeline. He shows that reported performance information is used by legislators mostly in the pre-decisional and the post-decisional stage in order a) to identify problems and set them on the political agenda, b) to specify alternatives and c) to monitor the implementation of programs and policy initiatives, respectively. In the decisional stage, however, written performance information is relatively less used in order d) to take a stand on a particular issue. Case documents provided by the administration as well as local party programs appear to be more influential in forming legislators’ positions in this stage. Overall, Askim (2007, p. 464f) identifies two clusters in terms of levels of performance information utilization. First, utilization proved to be higher among legislators working with elderly care, administrative affairs, and educational affairs than among those concerned with cultural affairs, technical ser-
vices, as well as planning and commercial development. Second, these differences among legislators of different policy fields turned out to be stable through the three stages of decision-making, except for those working with administrative affairs and technical services. For these legislators, performance information’s use increased during the course of decision-making stages. Askim (2007, p. 466; 2009, p. 34) notes that these and other findings seem to contradict those of ter Bogt, but abstains from a further elaboration of possible reasons.

To our knowledge, the most recent empirical treatment is provided by Raudla (2012). Her focus is on the direct use of performance information in legislators’ budgetary decision-making. Six years after Pollitt’s (2006a) overview, Raudla (2012, p. 2) reconfirms that the empirical basis we have so far on this aspect is still limited. She (2012, p. 3ff) summarizes theoretical perspectives that underlie current analyses of legislators’ use of performance information. Thereby, Raudla finds propositions for and against the use of performance information by legislators for making budgeting decisions.

**Table 3: Theoretical Perspectives on Legislators’ Use of Performance Information**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical Perspective</th>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agency Theory</strong></td>
<td>Legislators pay attention to performance information in order to alleviate information asymmetry between the two branches of government.</td>
<td>Askim (2008); Banks (1989)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislators may be reluctant to apply performance information in order to make decisions about the allocation of resources because they lack trust in the information provided by the executive branch</td>
<td>Bourdeaux (2008); Calvert (1985); Wang (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational Learning Theory</strong></td>
<td>Legislators make use of available performance information in order to improve the quality of budgeting decisions.</td>
<td>Willoughby &amp; Melkers (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislators consult performance information in order to identify declining performance and to point out gaps between intended and actual performance.</td>
<td>Askim (2007); Melkers &amp; Willoughby (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theories of Political Behavior and Communication</strong></td>
<td>Politicians are more concerned with the future than the past; hence, they are more interested in the goals set than in applying performance information for ex post evaluations of goal attainment.</td>
<td>Askim (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Performance information is used selectively rather than systematically because of opportunistic and strategic reasons of legislators. Legislators from governing parties can be expected to highlight measures indicating success, while legislators of opposition parties point to failures.</td>
<td>Moynihan (2005a); Patty (2009); Pollitt (2006b); Julnes &amp; Holzer (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theories of Political Budgetary Behavior</strong></td>
<td>Budgeting is a process driven more by political rationality than by economic rationality. Hence, various aspects ‘prevent’ the allocation of resources according to what performance information would suggest.</td>
<td>Bendor; Taylor, &amp; Van Gaalen (1987); Rubin (1993); Wildavsky (1966)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, based on eight semi-structured interviews with former members of the finance committee of the Estonian parliament Raudla (2012, p. 14) finds more support for those theoretical perspectives that are skeptical about the extent to which performance information has a direct impact on budgeting decisions or on the budget discourse. Table 3 above depicts Raudla’s (2012) summary of relevant theoretical perspectives concerning legislators’ performance information use and adds further exemplary work to each perspective.
In sum and in both periods, the study of parliamentary use of information is driven by reforms that led to an increased exposure of individual legislators to information of different kinds. Inquiries of the 1970s and 1980s focus mostly on the use of policy information and evaluate the effects decentralization and specialization of U.S. Congress had thereon. More recent works are interested in the general use of performance information on administrative action. It is characteristic for both periods that the ultimate research interest lies on the impact information provided to legislators has on particular decisions. Overall, overwhelming evidence of legislators’ little value of available information exist alongside patchy insights of its factual and direct use for decision-making purposes. We argue that a turn to conceptual treatments of human information behavior – including works from allied scholarly fields – may help understand contradictory findings and set the course for a more systematic analysis of politicians’ information behavior.

**INFORMATION IN CONCEPTUAL TREATMENTS**

Publications providing conceptual foundations for the study of legislators’ information behavior are based on an actor-centered paradigm. It requires the clarification of three basic questions: first, why does an individual need for information arise at all?; second, what is the basis of politicians’ policy positions and how does information fit therein?; and lastly, what do we mean by using information? We have selected these aspects for further elaboration, because they may help us to conceptually grasp the “things” to which we aim to attach the empirical “facts”, as Sartori (1970, p. 1039) has put it.

**Human Information Behavior Occurs in Context**

Performance information supplied by the public administration serves a purpose. From its perspective, this type of information is first and foremost meant to provide the basis for performance appraisals by politicians. The underlying assumption is that information on these dimensions serves politicians’ need to do so. However, for politicians, this kind of information is secondary when it comes to how public managers, programs, and organization are to be evaluated (ter Bogt, 2004). This is not because of a bad understanding about how this has to be carried out but because of a different one. Apparently, politicians’ need for appraisal is much better served by process related information, whereas information on outputs and outcomes is used for various other purposes along the decision-making process (Askim, 2007). Instead of focusing on the analysis of a particular kind of information – such as performance information – considerations from the field of information science suggest that the utilization of any kind of information and human information behavior in general are better understood by shifting the research focus toward the actors and their context.

Building on Wilson (1981, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2006a, 2006b) and on his widely acknowledged conception of human information behavior (Bawden, 2006; Cronin, 2001; Jarvelin & Wilson, 2003), it is claimed that research which aims to understand the actual use of a particular kind of information should focus on the end user and on the context wherein the individual information behavior occurs. This notion rests upon the
fundamental proposition that a *need for information* does not arise out of a vacuum but is induced by a particular *situation* in which a person finds herself. An information need is not to be conceived as a primary need. When people look for information, they try to satisfy personal needs of a more basic nature (Wilson, 1999, p. 252), such as physiological, affective, and cognitive needs (Wilson, 2006a, p. 663). Because the situations in which information is sought and used are social situations, these basic needs in turn can be claimed to arise out of the roles a particular person fills in social life and within a particular environment. One of these roles might be the professional role and the corresponding set of activities and responsibilities – all embedded in some organizational setting, where earnings or other satisfactions are pursued and sanctions avoided.

In essence, individuals’ and hence politicians’ information behavior is to be conceived as a consequence of particular circumstances, evoking basic needs that require satisfaction (Wilson, 1999, p. 251). Multiple options might be available to reach that goal out of which the acquisition of information is only one among a whole host of possibilities. By the same token, it is not to be assumed that conventionally defined performance information are the only kind of information on which politicians ground their performance judgments. Rather, a myriad of different types of information may complement or even substitute another in order to satisfy an individual need for appraisal. Surveying politicians about the overall use of one particular kind of information is too general an approach, because it misses to grasp this plurality of opportunities actors have and it lacks the comparative perspective on performance information.

As Wilson notes, his model is a ‘macro-model’ or a model of the ‘gross information seeking behavior’ which suggests how information needs may arise in general and their dependents on the context (Wilson, 1999, p. 252). However, for the analysis of the concrete information need of a politician, we require an approach for the ‘micro-moment’ of how particular situations evoke information needs.

Kagan (1972, p. 54) proposed to conceive the concept of *information need* as a “cognitive representation of a future goal that is desired.” However defined, information need remains a subjective concept, an experience that occurs only in the mind of a person and is beyond direct observation. One obvious way of operationalizing information needs is therefore to look for how the actual demands for information change; that is, an analysis of the different kinds of information or information sources used depending on the situation (Brittain, 1970, p. 3). To our knowledge, this is the way empirical studies of politicians information behavior have addressed the issue so far. However, exploring particular information needs means, in addition, addressing the fundamental question of *why* an individual decides to seek information, what purposes she believes it will serve and how the information will actually be used when received. An examination of information demands solely is thus rather unsatisfactory, because it cannot provide answers on these questions.

From a theoretical perspective, the question of why people tend to look for information can either be tackled from an ‘objective’ or a ‘subjective’ point of view (Case, 2008, p. 72ff). From the former perspective, information needs are thought to be relatively fixed and assumed to stem from some sort of uncertainty. Purposeful thinking, advocates of this camp suggest, leads to information seeking and its instrumental use to solve an ex-
isting problem and to reduce uncertainty, respectively (e.g., Atkin, 1972, 1973). Approaches belonging to the subjective camp originate from semiotics; the study of language and other cultural products as systems of signs that convey meaning by way of established conventions. From this perspective, information needs and subsequent search are contingent upon how a person perceives a particular situation. Subsequent information search and utilization are then considered as attempts to ‘make sense’ of that situation (Artandi, 1973, p. 243f).

Brenda Dervin’s Sense-Making-Approach offers, according to Case (2008, p. 75), the most ambitious attempt to explain the origins of information needs. The concept consists of a situation, out of which information needs arise; a gap that emerges as a difference between the existing situation and the desired situation (e.g., uncertainty reduction); a corresponding outcome or, in other words, the consequences of the sense-making process; finally, the bridge entails some means of closing the gap between exiting situation and the envisioned outcome. From this perspective, information needs are conceived as individual attempts to answer questions in one’s head and to make sense of a current, ‘gappy’ situation (Dervin, 1983, p. 170; Savolainen, 2006, p. 1120). This may be a quite rational attempt to solve a problem or to reduce uncertainty, but may also be triggered by a vague feeling of unease or simply by anxiety about a current situation.

In sum, and as Wilson (1999, p. 253f) comments, Dervin’s approach allows to analyze individual information behavior in context. In addition, it unfolds its strengths for the study of politicians’ information behavior because of its methodological consequences. The approach prompts a way of questioning that attempts to reveal the nature of the problematic situation, the extent to which information serves to bridge the gap, and the nature of the outcomes from the use of information.

**Ideology, Interest and Information as the Basis of Policy Positions**

Askim’s (2007) strategy to respect the context of legislators’ information use and to analyze the extent of performance information utilization along the decision-making process represents a promising approach which clearly evidences that one kind of information, namely performance information, is considered to varying degrees and for different purposes depending on the particular situation. However, we think that the shift of the research focus away from the examination of particular kinds of information could be more radical in order to gain even more insights about politicians’ information behavior. We propose to climb the ‘ladder of abstraction’, as Sartori (1970, p. 1040f) noted, to create a more inclusive concept of the situation than decision-making stages. It has to be one that allows the identification of the reasons for the varying extent information use and provides at the same time the possibility to hypothesize about how information is put in place by politicians when actually used. It therefore seems advisable to consult treatments that try to understand information’s proper place within the entire phenomenon of individual decision making of politicians, before information as a particular aspect of interest is uncoupled and analyzed in more detail.

In the end of the 1970s, Carol Weiss began a sequence of seminal articles and developed conceptual ideas which, according to Pollitt (2006a, p. 43), are the most cited within the research area of politicians’ information need and use and are still relevant to
date (Weiss, 1979, 1997, 1998). Weiss conceives the formation of policy positions of politicians as the resultant of a complex interplay of three sets of forces: their ideologies, their interests, and the information they have. Weiss (1983, p. 221) notes the fact that when different groups of actors engage in discussions and bargaining to determine the final shape of potential policies, other forces come into play. It is well known that negotiations within and across organizations as well as in the political arena are affected by a variety of structural and procedural influences; such as hierarchy, specialization, fragmentation of issues, reliance on routines, control of information resources, and so forth (cf. Weiss, 1983, p. 221, FN 4 for various treaties on these aspects). Nevertheless, Weiss holds that, “the content of each group’s policy positions, as these are advanced initially and modified in the course of negotiations, is based on the interplay of ideology, interests, and information as the group interprets them” (1983, p. 221, italics in original).

For Weiss, ideology encompasses a broad range: philosophy, principles, values, political orientations. Ideology may imply for her any relatively coherent political predisposition as well as vague proclivities. In essence, at ideology’s core are ethical and moral values, which generate general dispositions toward particular policies. These dispositions come into being because political ideology represents an “evaluative-descriptive-prescriptive account of the political world” that is “normative, ethical, moral in tone and content” (Lane, 1962a, p. 15; 1962b, p. 173f). Although people’s ideologies may be loosely integrated, they represent a basis for position taking, because they provide an emotionally charged normative orientation toward an issue. In other words, although most of the people do not have comprehensive ideologies that provide a ready-made answer to every problematic situation, they have general predispositions like ‘government should not overregulate private enterprises’ or ‘the environment should be protected’ which give them a clear direction to work out their ideological position when dealing with concrete issues.

Interest is primarily defined as self-interest and encompasses, for example, the fact that politicians strive for reelection, their ambitions for higher authority positions, their eagerness for power and influence. Interests represent “the stuff of politics” (Weiss, 1983, p. 224f). The play of interests dominates our thinking of policymaking. Very often, it takes place at center stage and is disseminated by the media. But it also goes on backstage, in the offices of agencies and at meetings of policy actors. Elected representatives have a stake in the configuration a particular policy takes. The ‘electoral imperative’ is a familiar concept for a long time now (Mayhew, 1974): Legislators as a particular group of policy actors care about voters’ preferences and the effects of a decision on their chances for reelection, their relationships to fellow party members and other parliamentarians, the consequences for chairmanship within parliamentary committees, etc. A familiar sociological proposition is that people tend to believe in ideologies that are in line with their self-interest. Findings with this respect are well-documented and summarized under the maxim ‘where you stand depends upon where you sit’ (Weiss, 1983, p. 237).

Information represents the factual assumptions, on which policy positions are based (Weiss, 1983, p. 225ff). Information of any kind comes from many sources: from the
politicians’ own parties or organizations and their routines and structures or from interest groups located outside these structures; it is conveyed through formal and informal channels or systems; it may originate from the own experience, from friends, neighbors, the media, or flow from a variety of other sources. Information supplied by the public administration fits somewhere in this “informational mélange” (Weiss, 1983, p. 228). However, in politics too, information does not exist as such, but has bearing on policy positions by being embedded in an explanatory framework. Depending on the policy issue of interest, a particular model usually suggests a causal relationship in the sense that, changes in a variable $X$ will lead to changes in an outcome $Y$, simply put.

The point is that, these three forces allow operationalizing the concept of the context and to hypothesize about the likely potential for information to enter individual decision-making in a substantial way. Depending on the situation in which the politician finds herself and the decision to be made, respectively, the influence of each force – information, interests, ideology – on the formation of a policy position varies. The potential for information to be considered mainly depends on three different interactions (Weiss, 1983, pp. 229-239): The extent to which the information supplied is compatible with prior information or with settled knowledge about ‘how the world works’; the way in which available information alters a politician’s perception of which policy position is in her interest; and lastly, whether existing information is supportive or challenging to politicians’ basic policy predispositions and her ideology, respectively. This so-called ‘ideology-interest-information framework’ is used as a diagnostic scheme for identifying the configuration of these factors in a particular policy situation. The framework allows developing, as Weiss (1983, p. 241ff) proposes, hypotheses about the likely effects of information under different circumstances.

In essence, one could claim that all potential situations a politician finds herself differ according to the degree to which ideology and interests harmoniously suggest how to decide on a particular issue. For example, at one extreme, we can think of situations where a politician’s ideological commitments are powerful and interests arrayed on one side of the issue. In such situation one could hypothesize that new information incompatible with the current constellation will have a small chance to influence what a politician ‘already knows’ and hence, will rather not alter the position her ideology and interest harmoniously suggest on that issue. We may call these kinds of constellations Situation 0. In Situation 0 the world and the relationships therein are clear to a person, no ambiguities exist, and decisions are usually made ‘in passing’ since ideology and interest tell the politician how to position in no uncertain terms. This is not to say that all politicians make the same decision on a given problem but that it is clear where a particular politician will stand, since we know where she sits.

At the other extreme, it is possible to think of policy issues where a politician finds her ideology and interests in conflict and where only new information can help to solve her dilemma. In such a situation she ‘does not already know’ what to decide on a particular issue. The ideology she believes in and the interests she represents fail to provide a harmonious orientation, so that we may hypothesize that she will likely welcome new information that helps her to take a position. These kinds of constellations could be labeled Situation 1. In Situation 1 the world and the relationships therein are ambiguous.
and confusing. This prevents a politician from easily taking a position and makes her receptive for ideas or information that help her recast the nature of the problem. It is not clear where she will stand, because she does not exactly know where she is sitting.

In sum, applying the ‘ideology-interest-information framework’ provides a more inclusive analytical approach that covers, for example, a differentiation among timely defined decision-making stages. The achieved generality comes without any loss of precision, since, the remaining differentiates – decision situations located between the poles of Situation 0 and Situation 1 – are precise. No matter how all-embracing the conceptualization obtained appears to be, it still bears a traceable relation to a collection of specifics – ideology, interests, and interest – that can empirically be tested (Sartori, 1970, p. 1041).

**The Use of Information**

The situation thus defined and within which a politician finds herself is not only held accountable for shaping her information needs and staking out information’s general potential to influence positioning, but is also claimed to affect the way available information is actually used. The focus of current literature prevents conclusions about this aspect of politicians’ information behavior. In general, current studies with substantial empirical components credit their utmost attention to the extent to which a particular kind of information is reported to be used by politicians and take it implicitly for granted that this information, say performance information, is used according to its designated role – namely, for the evaluation of an agency’s or a program’s performance.

The use of performance information by politicians for performance evaluation purposes is only one type of use and corresponds to, what Weiss (1979, p. 427) has called, the ‘Problem-Solving Model’ or what Caplan (1976) has named as the ‘engineering model’; a pending decision implies that information provides empirical evidence and conclusions that help to take a position on a particular issue or to solve a problem at hand. However, there are other understandings of what ‘using information’ may actually come to mean. In sharp contrast to this understanding stands the ‘Political Model’ of information use. For example, in Situation 0 constellations where strong ideological commitments exist and interests array on the same side of the issue, positions that politicians take are claimed to be highly predetermined and information’s potential to shift such a position can be considered to be rather low. However, this is not to say that provided information is not used at all. In such circumstance information is likely to be used, for example, as “ammunition for the side that finds its conclusions congenial and supportive” (Weiss, 1979, p. 429), and probably denied or disputed by the other side.

The potential of analytic information to be used these ways has been acknowledge by different authors (e.g., Davidson, 1976; Knorr, 1977; Lindlom & Cohen, 1979; Wildavsky, 1979). By studying the role of policy analysis in congressional decision-making Whiteman (1985) provided empirical evidence on this phenomenon and identified three types of information use by politicians. He notes that “what primarily differentiates the three types of use is the strength of the policy-maker’s commitment to specific solutions to policy problems” (Whiteman, 1985, p. 298ff). Substantive use of information is observed in the absence of strong commitments to specific solutions. In
such policy situations available information is used by legislators in the search for a satisfactory issue positioning. *Elaborative* use describes the utilization of analytic information in extending and refining the components of a position, which is already enveloped by a commitment to a specific approach to the policy issue. In cases where legislators have made strong commitments to a well-defined position, policy analysis is used *strategically* in the process of “reinforcing or confirming the wisdom of individual judgments regarding current legislative approaches of general policy questions” (Whiteman, 1985, p. 302). In addition, Whiteman observed that these different types of use were linked to the degree of conflict over an issue in the sense that greater conflict resulted in more strategic use of information. Substantive and elaborative utilization are less common but consequential in low conflict environments, where legislators try to arrive at or modify issue positioning.

Other authors have developed different categories for basically the same ideas (see Leviton & Hughes, 1981, p. 528f for examples). In sum, they highlight an important aspect that has been out of focus so far – namely, that the term ‘use’ is rather misleading, since it attempts to describe something that in fact is much better characterized as ‘interplay’ between an available information and a situation bounded individual. Rein (1980, p. 366) therefore holds that information “has no meaning independent of its use.” He is essentially arguing what has already been noted by Dervin; that is, that the use of information is dependent upon the gap an individual politician perceives in a given situation. This approach does not assume a ‘neutrally’ acting legislator but individuals behaving according to how they see and interpret things and people around them. Their worldview fundamentally shapes the definition of a particular policy problem and, logically consistent, can be claimed to alter the ultimate use of available information.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF POLITICIANS’ INFORMATION BEHAVIOR**

Research’s interest in legislators’ information behavior is not new. It was a topic of heated debate decades ago, when reforms aimed at enhancing U.S. Congress’ capacity to make informed policy decisions. There is an agreement that after these reforms, as Bimber (1991, p. 590) concludes, Congress was indeed better equipped with information and expertise. However, more information did neither alter the policy process nor did the availability of expertise guarantee its use by legislators. To us, current research on the availability and utilization of performance information resembles very much the reform debate of the 1970s and 1980s, except for the kind of information that is of main interest nowadays. With this respect, it is surprising that treatments of politicians’ behavior toward performance information do not build more systematically on existing concepts and empirical results.

**General Implications for Future Research**

This paper aimed at drawing an outline of the knowledge we have about politicians’ information need and use. Essentially, we argue that existing and sometimes contradictory results could be better appreciated, if attempts to understand politicians’ behavior toward performance information would be based on research designs that consider the
implications of context, the information-decision nexus in a political environment, and the possibility of using available information in non-substantive ways. Reorienting research according to these aspects has implications on what traditionally has been understood by performance information.

First, the reform debate of the 1970s and 1980s highlights that the problems of using expertise and policy analysis were seldom connected to its quality or quantity. Rather, the value of the information for legislators varied according to the political context it was provided (Bimber, 1991, p. 586). The inclusion of context in the study of politicians’ information behavior is crucial. It conceptualizes individual information needs as second order needs which arise out of a particular policy situation a politician faces. Information of whatever kind is therefore to be treated as only one mean toward a specific end. Performance information can be claimed to compete with other means of goal attainment or to supplement them, but it is hard to treat it in isolation from context. Askim’s (2007) disaggregation of the policy cycle in different decision stages is an indication for the claim that the relevance of performance information varies depending on the situation. It qualifies conclusions suggesting that performance information is not valued by politicians and used only rarely. Attempts to understand the use, nonuse or even misuse of performance information need therefore to address how politicians perceive the decision situations they face, what questions they try to answer therein, and elaborate on the goals these actors try to achieve by using performance information. The inclusion of context implies a shift from the analysis of particular kinds of information toward the context-bounded individual.

Second, the ‘ideology-interest-information’ framework provides a useful approach to operationalize that context and the policy situations politicians face, respectively. It acknowledges that information is only one factor on which politicians base their decisions. By integrating the influence of ideology and interests, the framework allows incorporating the political rationale which mediates the information-decision nexus and conditions the claim that performance information has per se little potential to influence individual decision-making in a political context. In other words, in policy situations, where individual predispositions of politicians are claimed to be strong, information that is incompatible with the individual constellation of ideology and interest can indeed be expected to have a low potential to influence the outcome of individual decisions. However, if we think of policy situations where ideology and interests cause a dilemma for a legislator in the sense that individual predispositions fail to provide a clear issue-position, available performance information would have at least a hypothetical potential to orient politicians’ decision outcomes.

Third, as Feldman & March (1981) have argued, information is embedded in social norms that make it highly symbolic. As most of the empirical treatments show, information of whatever kind is only rarely used in patterns envisioned by simple rational decision theory; that is, in a substantive way in order to make ‘rational’ decisions. Rather, available information was observed to be used by politicians mostly in a strategic way (Whiteman, 1985). Why should this be different for the case of performance information? Besides highlighting the boundary conditions for performance information to be used in a substantive way, Weiss’s (1983) framework allows understanding the vari-
ous other purposes performance information supplied by the public administration may serve in a political context.

This shift in the focus of analysis implies, lastly, a fundamentally different understanding of performance information. Conceiving politicians as need-driven and goal-oriented information users in particular policy situations requires that the definition of what pieces of data provide information about a manager’s, public program’s or organization’s performance is within the meaning of the individual, or at least within the meaning of the group of politicians. The conventional claim that performance information refers to systematic information about outputs and outcomes basically presumes that performance is to be evaluated based on results, efficiency and effectiveness. Ter Bogt’s (2001, 2003) studies on the evaluation style of politicians suggests that these are not the primary criteria along which politicians judge performance. Rather, they seem to focus on dimensions that report on the various aspects of the functioning of the organization and the manager. From this perspective – and to put it simply – studies that define performance information conventionally ‘necessarily’ arrive to the conclusion that instruments reporting on outputs and outcomes are rarely used to evaluate performance. In this light, results showing that legislators do use written performance information and previously considered as contradictory to existing insights (see Askim, 2007, p. 466; Askim, 2009, p. 34) become compatible, since they evidence that performance information is used by politicians for different purposes — for example, to identify problems and set them on the political agenda, to specify alternatives, and to monitor the implementation of programs and policy initiatives (Askim, 2007, p. 458ff).

Practical Research Strategy Implications

Aside from these general implications for future research, we want to put forward practical research strategy implications concerning the relevant unit of analysis, the nature of the cases to be studied as well as the characteristics of expedient research methods.

As empirical studies from both research periods show, lobbyists, staffers, and specialist legislators act as knowledge brokers and ‘filter’ information of all kinds before key takeaways are communicated to other politicians. With respect to future research on performance information use, one could therefore ask whether we should continue to focus on individual politicians as the relevant unit of observation or rather focus on groups of people, such as a politician and her staff or on groups of politicians. This focus would help us to illuminate how information finds its way through the political arena; that is, to identify the ‘structures’ of various communication flows between front-benchers and back-benchers, specialist and non-specialist legislators, or between politicians and staffers — all affecting in one way or another the content of any kind of information and its potential use.

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We think that there are at least three reasons why future research should stick to the individual politician as the relevant unit of analysis. First, studies from the 1970s and 1980s do focus on groups and already provide a good deal of knowledge about the flow of information among the various actors and actor groups involved in the entire parliamentary decision-making process (see Sabatier & Whiteman, 1985, pp. 395-401, 413-415 for a review of those studies and conclusions): For example, we know from these studies that legislators heavily rely on cues from specialized colleagues; that these specialist legislators are substantially involved in setting the agenda and specifying policy alternatives in committees; that the legislative staff can, overall, be considered as the most important source of information for specialist legislators, but that staff influence depends on the structure of its resources; that nonspecialists have more contact with external sources, such as administrative agencies and interest groups; that all legislators consult different sources in order to obtain ‘policy information’ compared to ‘political information’; and that the most important criteria for selecting sources of policy information are the source’s accessibility, and its ability to provide concise, relevant information in a timely manner. We doubt that a refocus of research activities on groups will bring more to light for the case of performance information than what is already known for the broader category of policy information.

Second, as one might argue, the filtering and transformation of information, which is propelled by a variety of structural and procedural influences of groups, necessarily results in biased information for the individual political decision maker. One can therefore claim that observing an individual’s information behavior underestimates the factual use of performance information; since hierarchy, specialization, fragmentation of issues, reliance on routines, control of information resources, and so forth cause distortions. Hence, looking at groups would much more reflect the ‘real’ extent of performance information use. There are convincing formal arguments suggesting that this might be an erroneous belief. Basically, the core of those arguments holds that distortions in the ‘informational reservoir’ to which an individual has access become already manifest on the group level. In a seminal article, Calvert (1985) has shown that political principals with bias look for information and opinions that come from sources with similar biases. The logic is straightforward: even though neutral advice and ‘unfiltered’ information may be available, a politician chooses to consult advisors and information which are biased toward her own predispositions, because they are more likely to be effective in affecting her final decision (Calvert, 1985, p. 551). This ‘demand side’ calculus of biased information acquisition has recently been complemented by Patty’s (2009) ‘supply side’ argument of biased information provision. Being aware of the politician’s preferences concerning policy options, even unbiased advisors bias their “information collection in a manner that confirms the political principal’s ex ante bias” (Patty, 2009, p. 386, italics in original). Voluntarily biased information provision by advisors is based on a two-pronged logic: The pursuit of unbiased information is counterproductive for the advisor, because, on the one hand, it frequently does not have an effect on the politician’s choice of which policy option to choose, but, on the other hand, does lower the quality with which the final policy chosen is implemented. In sum, we have good reasons for future research to avoid a less parsimonious group level approach, if the distortions it thereby seeks to counter do not vanish.
Lastly, studying groups of people is clearly directed toward investigating the ‘information-seeking behavior’ of politicians and not their information needs. It is legitimate to focus on this dimension and to derive more pragmatic conclusions concerning the design of information systems and its development in light of existing communication structures. This approach may reveal insights with respect to the efficiency of information systems or their effectiveness – e.g., how fast can they provide responses in what quality? However, “such studies may never address the central question of ‘information need’, that is, why the user decides to seek information, what purpose he believes it will serve and to what use it is actually put when received” (Wilson, 2006a, p. 662).

Another concrete research design issue that is closely related to the relevant unit of analysis concerns the nature of the cases we choose to study. Since we know that politicians have varying issue interests, the question arises whether we should consider politicians’ ‘average’ decision behavior or focus only on their behavior related to subjects of great importance to them. Analyzing ‘average’ decision behavior, as existing studies in both research periods demonstrate, can reveal the overall popularity of particular information sources, provide the relative frequency with which an information source is consulted, inform us about the direction and the intensity of communication flows, and may come up with other, more general and rather ‘structural’ insights. But because information behavior is highly contextual, this approach may fall short of grasping the dynamics a concrete policy situation induces on the goals to be attained, the individual information needs which arise therefrom, and the role particular information may play for a politician to attain those goals. It seems more promising for future research to concentrate on particular or concrete decisions and try to infer from those cases insights that help explain why certain information sources are preferred while others are used less frequently, why the flow of communication among actors takes on a particular structure, and so on. However, this does not necessarily imply that we should confront politicians only with subjects important to them. It only means that we should not ask haphazardly.

With respect to appropriate research methods, this actor-centered paradigm of information behavior requires future research to apply extremely case sensitive data-gathering techniques. For example, Dervin’s (1983) Sense-Making-Approach offers an interview method for revealing how politicians perceive a particular policy situation, what they define as ‘gappy’ or problematic therein, and how available information may serve to bridge that gap. The approach allows the researcher to enter the realm of intensive interviewing (Case, 2008, p. 214) and to gather in-depth information about phenomena which are very much subjective in nature. At the same time, this method sacrifices a considerable potential to generalize findings.

One way to enlarge this potential could be to embed Dervin’s interview approach in a quasi-experimental design (Cook & Campbell, 1979). Weiss’ (1983) ‘ideology-interest-information framework’ represents a promising opportunity to frame the basic experimental conditions. In a simple setting, participants would be confronted with a ‘Situation 0’ or ‘Situation 1’ scenario. Different kinds of information could be made available for review – on a so called ‘story board’ or a computer monitor (Case, 2008, p. 200) –, before an individual decision about the policy issue would be made. Embedded in this
main method, but sequentially after the experimental part, the researcher could conduct her interview with a special focus on the dimensions of interest but based on the specific policy decision presented.8

Instead of creating a static picture of politicians’ preferences for particular kinds of information, systems or sources, the experimental part of such a ‘concurrent nested strategy’ (Creswell, 2003, p. 218f) would confront a participating politician with a specific decision problem in order to systematically observe, analyze and compare her information behavior with that of others handling the same or another problem. The idea is not to make statistical generalizations for the population of politicians. The quasi-experimental part is rather useful to make theoretical generalizations (Webster & Sell, 2007, p. 190ff); to characterize basic mechanisms that are at work when politicians consider information in particular decision situations. Ideally constructed, these scenarios would represent extremes with respect to the degree to which ideology and interests harmoniously suggest how to position. However, the approach’s strength could be its ability to highlight the boundaries the political rational sets for the use of information.

From our point of view, the interview nested in the quasi-experimental approach is vital for the main goal of explaining politicians’ information behavior in these two polar situations. It should therefore be designed to capture politicians’ view of the problematic (gappy) situations. It should aim at empirically characterizing and apprehending the information needs politicians have, when facing such a context, the extent to which information serves to bridge the gap, and the nature of the outcomes from the use of information. Mapping politicians’ perceptions and arguments in different situations, contrasting them with the observed behavior, and making a comparison within and among experimental groups could allow future research to shift toward the functions and purposes available information serves for politicians given a particular context.

In sum, such a design is meant to take the potential influence of ‘politics’ seriously. The decision problems presented to the participating politicians require weighing politically salient values. They would be a constitutive feature of the study and would allow to take the end user of performance information – the individual politician – as the starting point of analysis; that is, to examine from the very beginning how constellations of ideology and interests drive the subjective definition of the decision problem, frame the subsequent aspects of information behavior, and shape the decision ultimately taken.

NOTES

1 There is no clear understanding, neither in praxis nor in academia, about the meaning of performance information (Siegel & Summermatter, 2008). Our working definition therefore refers to core dimensions of performance.

2 Science Citation Index Expanded (1899-present), Social Sciences Citation Index (1898-present), Arts & Humanities Citation Index (1975-present), Conference Proceedings Citation Index- Science (1990-present), Conference Proceedings Citation Index - Social Science & Humanities (1990-present).
The records that directly cite or are directly cited by the target record are the first generation, records citing records that cite the target record and records cited by records cited by the target record are the second generation, etc.

This two-stage model of information flow and the possibility of lobbyist groups to influence the political agenda was later formalized by Austen-Smith (1993).

However, from these two basic approaches different middle range theories and models of information behavior were developed and are comprehensively summarized by Fisher, Erdelez & McKechnie (2009).

This information-processing model of decision-making is formalized by Sylvan, Goel, & Chandrasekaran (1990).

In accordance with organization theorists like Herbert Simon and James March decision making is conceived in a broader sense and encompasses not only the final selection among various alternatives but also the preceding activity of identifying the issue worth of attention, setting goals, and designing suitable courses of action (March, 1994, p. 23; Simon, 1992, p. 32).

For design guidance, one can consult the literature on consumer behavior, which includes a great number of attempts at using experiments to understand how people look for and use information when faced with a purchasing decision (e.g., Hauser, Urban, & Weinberg, 1993 cited in Case, 2008, p. 199). The idea to combine the experimental approach with an interview comes from experimental psychology, where researchers are not only interested in determining the aggregate effects of an experimental situation but also the individual perception that might have produced those effects. Helpful advice for how interview questions should be framed within such a setting is already available (e.g., Kahn, 1991; Merton & Kendall, 1946).

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